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At the end of October 2016, the Conservative government of Theresa May came out in 
support of the construction of a third runway at Heathrow airport. In announcing the 
‘momentous step for our country’, Chris Grayling, the Secretary of State for 
Transport, declared that his government’s support for Heathrow expansion ‘send[s] a 
clear message today that Britain is open for business’ and ‘shows that this is a 
government unafraid to take the difficult decisions and get on with the job’.1 At least 
in political terms, this long-awaited decision seems to suggest that the Airports 
Commission had successfully completed its task. On the one hand, the launch of the 
Commission had kept aviation expansion off the national political agenda in the run-
up to the 2015 election. On the other hand, it had reframed aviation policy by looping 
public debate back to the issues of connectivity and capacity, and away from earlier 
preoccupations with climate change and the environmental impacts of air travel, 
which were especially evident in 2010-2011.  
 
However, the Airports Commission was not successful in generating the ‘evidence-
based consensus’ to which it aspired. 2 The October decision was not unanimously 
acclaimed. Conservative MP Zac Goldsmith resigned his Richmond Park seat to fight 
a by-election as an independent candidate. In the run-up to the announcement, May 
had also been obliged to loosen the ties of collective responsibility in her cabinet to 
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accommodate dissenting voices in the government, including, most notably, Justine 
Greening, Secretary of State for Education, and Boris Johnson, who was the new 
Foreign Secretary. Beyond the confines of the House of Commons, local resident 
groups and campaigners vowed to fight the decision. The Campaign to Protect Rural 
England dismissed the approval of the third runway as ‘madness’, while John Stewart, 
chair of HACAN, the local resident group against Heathrow expansion, claimed that 
‘real doubts must remain whether this new runway will ever see the light of day. The 
hurdles it faces remain: costs, noise, air pollution and widespread opposition including 
an expected legal challenge from the local authorities’.3 Thus, although it put airport 
expansion back on the political agenda, it remains questionable about the extent to 
which the processes and work of the Airports Commission were able to reframe 
aviation policy and engineer a broad coalition in support of its new policy settlement. 
 
This article offers an assessment of the character, role and outcomes of the Airports 
Commission. We begin by analysing its workings from September 2012 until the 
publication of its final report in July 2015, after which we chart the criticisms of its 
modus operandi and its final recommendations. Our argument is that the work of the 
Airports Commission and its attempts to depoliticise aviation through appeals to its 
‘reasonable’ methods and judgements, as well as the character of Howard Davies 
himself, quickly unravelled once the Commission’s final report was released into the 
public domain, especially when it became clear what its proposals for ‘deliver[ing] the 
maximum connectivity bang for each of our carbon bucks’ meant in practice. Indeed, 
in many ways, public debate soon returned to the perennial arguments and contentions 
that have dogged aviation expansion since the early 2000s. Ultimately, however, we 
conclude that the responsibility for this failure does not reside simply at the door of 
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the Airports Commission. It rests in failed political leadership and the ‘missed 
opportunity’ to build and project a sustainable vision for aviation in the aftermath of 
the 2010 moratorium on the building of runways in the south-east of England.  
 
 
THE POLITICAL WORK OF THE AIRPORTS COMMISSION  
 
At least until the publication of its final report, the Airports Commission appears to 
have successfully reinforced the conditions for a policy reversal by the Conservative 
government. Most importantly, it had acted as a catalyst for the provision of 
ideological cover for the Cameron government, while satisfying the demands of the 
pro-expansion Heathrow lobby. In itself, this was arguably a programmatic success for 
the Cameron government, after David Cameron’s ‘no ifs, no buts’ commitment not to 
expand Heathrow, and the Coalition government’s moratorium on new runways in the 
South-East in May 2010. Of course, the policy reversal in favour of the third runway 
at Heathrow was undoubtedly made possible by the resignation of Cameron after the 
referendum decision to leave the European Union (EU) in June 2016, as well as the 
shifting economic and political priorities that emerged in the post-Brexit period. But, 
in identifying the challenge facing government to be that of ‘balanc[ing] local interests 
against the wider, longer-term benefits for the UK’4, the Commission had arguably 
brought about a governmental reframing of the policy challenges in aviation, which 
stands in marked opposition to the Coalition government’s rejection of aviation 
expansion in 2010. Indeed, the government’s rhetoric after the publication of the 
Airports Commission harks back to the language of the 2003 Air Transport White 
Paper and New Labour’s expansionist commitments.  
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Here the role of Howard Davies and his commissioners was a crucial factor in the 
depoliticisation of aviation expansion. With the creation of the Commission the issue 
of airport expansion was transferred into a purportedly neutral domain, where 
impartial experts and professionals, who were immunised from day to day politics, 
could resolve the conflicts surrounding the need for additional capacity. In his 
numerous public interventions, Howard Davies thus employed the rhetoric of science 
and scientific expertise to try and produce an uncontestable decision, which could 
form the basis for a rational consensus on the issue. In particular, sophisticated 
methods of data analysis were employed in an effort to test various options. Figures, 
tables, graphs, sophisticated methods of statistical analysis, presentations of different 
scenarios, and so on, were vital parts of the arguments and proposals advanced by the 
Commission. At the same time, Sir Howard Davies, the chair of the Airports 
Commission, played on his appeal as a ‘reasonable’ and ‘fair-minded’ individual. 
Indeed, under his able stewardship the Commission sought to privilege open and 
transparent methods of working, which were grounded on a neutral review of 
evidence. In short, the character, judgement and reliability of the new body were 
extolled. 
 
Such rhetorical appeals were reiterated across different policy arenas by the leadership 
of the pro-expansion campaign. For example, in her opening address to delegates at 
the Westminster Energy, Environment and Transport Forum at the end of January 
2013, Baroness Valentine, chief executive of the pro-expansion lobby, London First, 
declared that ‘we need a rational head to look at the options, which as far as I know, 
Howard Davies has’.5 Indeed, Valentine’s intervention was one amongst many that 
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drew attention to the way in which the working methods of the Commission became 
embodied in the person of Sir Howard Davies. Almost immediately in the media and 
political circles the Airports Commission became simply the ‘Davies Commission’. 
But equally, through his own performances in meetings and public, the chair of the 
Commission became associated with a set of dispassionate and reasonable methods for 
decision-making and public engagement. In fact, even leading opponents of airport 
expansion praised the manner and knowledge of the Commission’s chair.  
 
What is more, as the work of the Commission unfolded, Davies himself appeared to 
function as a curious symbol of ambiguity in the complex process of seeking a 
settlement. In other words, his performance of ‘reasonable authority’, which was 
independent and could stand above the fray, was able for a time to conceal the 
differences between the competing demands for expansion, on the one hand, and the 
desire for environmental protection, on the other, which were being directed at the 
Commission. In this way, his very persona enabled the displacement of conflict and 
the de-politicisation of the issue. Indeed, his ‘reasoned’ practices of authority were 
juxtaposed with the threat of a return to the ‘pub politics’ of previous aviation debates. 
In the aftermath of the 2010 moratorium on airport expansion in the South-East of 
England, the former Conservative Secretary of State for Transport, Justine Greening, 
who was (and remains) an emphatic opponent of Heathrow expansion, had described 
the persistent failures to reach anything more than a temporary settlement in aviation 
policy from the 2003 Air Transport White Paper onwards as little more than ‘pub 
politics’.6  
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However, in its public interventions, the Airports Commission persistently returned to 
the dominant discourses and ideological narratives that have elevated the aviation 
industry into its powerful position in British society and the UK state. Importantly, it 
persistently bolstered the existing appeals to economic boosterism through the 
discourse of connectivity, thereby shifting the underlying economic justifications for 
expansion on to the hard-to-oppose benefits of international linkages and networks, as 
well as global competitiveness, and not simply through appeals to the direct economic 
benefits of airport expansion. Re-articulated through the discourse of connectivity, and 
the need for a global hub airport to maintain competitiveness, the many economic and 
social facets of the aviation industry – international trade, global connectivity, high-
tech manufacturing, tourism, military, aerospace, retailing, and so forth – were thus 
foregrounded in a political context where the search for economic growth had become 
an overriding concern for the Coalition government.  
 
Indeed, the Commission made use of the threat of catastrophic economic failure, and 
lost opportunities, if airport expansion was blocked. Without expansion, the UK 
would not simply forgo the direct economic benefits of aviation expansion, but would 
also weaken its global competitiveness, thus losing out to its rivals in emerging 
markets. Such appeals to the economic benefits of increased connectivity continued to 
resonate across key sections of the political class, particularly in the shifting context of 
economic crisis and austerity. According to an Ipsos-Mori poll, which was carried out 
over June and July 2014, 88 per cent of MPs agreed with the statement that a 
‘successful hub airport is critical to the UK’s future economic success’. 
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It is significant that that the work of the Airports Commission also opened up spaces 
for those actors who operate beyond the state to forge new coalitions in favour of 
airport expansion, thus providing ideological cover for the Cameron government. 
Through what we term a ‘logic of difference’ – splitting demands that have been 
linked together and then dealing with them in a piecemeal fashion - the Airports 
Commission had incorporated demands to lower carbon emissions through appeals to 
emissions trading and capping regimes, as in its final report where it both 
acknowledged and side-lined the widespread concerns over climate change that had 
mobilised opposition to expansion under New Labour. Indeed, it had named aviation 
noise in its interim report as the most significant obstacle to expansion at Heathrow 
airport, while transforming demands over noise pollution from fears over rising levels 
of aircraft noise into questions of trust and information.  
 
Such appeals and ways of working were cautiously welcomed and generally endorsed, 
even by opponents of expansion. Indeed, the final report of the Commission made 
clear the perceived lack of trust between local residents and airport authorities, put 
pressure on government to set up a new independent aviation noise authority and 
community engagement board, banned night flights, and established a package of 
compensation measures. In other words, Davies had at least recognised some of the 
grievances and demands of local residents. And this meant that even opponents of the 
third runway could lay claim to some mini-victories. Equally, Davies and the 
Commission could legitimately maintain that they had endeavoured to listen to the 
reasons and arguments against expansion, even if they had not been ultimately 
convinced by them.  
 
  8 
Supporting such strategies to decontest or depoliticise aviation noise, proponents of 
expansion- Let Britain Fly and London First - worked at the fringes of the 
Commission to advocate and construct support for the creation of an independent 
noise authority, as well as seeking to decouple the issue of noise from that of 
aviation’s carbon emissions. In one significant episode, in March 2014, London First 
and Let Britain Fly came together with HACAN to co-sponsor the first aviation noise 
summit, which was addressed by Howard Davies. Leading participants in the noise 
summit signed a joint public letter demanding that all political parties move towards 
the early consideration of an independent noise authority. Its rhetoric chimed with that 
of the Airports Commission, which had called for a ‘fresh approach’ to ‘restore trust 
and give people the confidence that their legitimate grievances are being addressed’ 
while alluding to the ‘common ground’ between signatories.7 
 
In fact, in the run-up to the 2015 general election, a cross-party consensus on 
expansion did appear to be forming. At its autumn 2014 party conference, the Liberal 
Democrat leadership tried unsuccessfully to amend the party’s pre-manifesto, which 
allowed support for a second runway at Gatwick. The decision left the Deputy Prime 
minister Nick Clegg claiming that ‘I just don’t think it makes sense to say that you’re 
never going to have a single metre of extra concrete anywhere, in any runway 
anywhere in the UK’. At the Labour party’s autumn conference, Ed Balls, then 
Shadow Chancellor, reproduced the rhetoric of the pro-expansion campaigners, when 
he declared that he would put an put an end to ‘dither and delay’, so that there would 
be ‘no more kicking [aviation] into the long-grass, but taking the right decisions for 
Britain’s long-term future’. And on the day of the publication of the final report, 
Michael Dugher, Labour’s then Shadow Secretary of State for Transport, whilst 
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recognising the need for the recommendation of a third runway to meet climate 
change commitments, was equally concerned in a press release to say ‘Labour has 
always been clear that more airport capacity is vital to Britain’s economic success and 
we need action if we are to maintain our status as Europe’s most important aviation 




THE UNRAVELLING OF THE AIRPORTS COMMISSION 
 
The publication of the final report in July 2015 triggered a flurry of attacks designed 
to discredit the recommendations of the Airports Commission. It was no secret that 
senior Conservative ministers - Justine Greening, Theresa May, and Philip Hammond, 
as well as Zac Goldsmith, MP for Richmond, and then London Mayor Boris Johnson - 
all opposed a third runway at the London airport. Echoing his earlier doubts, Johnson 
described the findings of the Davies Commission as an ‘outcome [that] I thought was 
inevitable because the mandate was to provide a political fig leaf for an establishment 
U-turn’. For his part, Goldsmith, who had made it know that he would resign and 
force a by-election if the third runway was to be given the go-ahead, condemned the 
final report for advancing an ‘obsolete’ model of aviation. Notably, the owners of 
Gatwick Airport refused to concede defeat to Heathrow. Stuart Wingate, chief 
executive of Gatwick, met the final report of the Commission with the claim that 
‘Gatwick is still very much in the race. The Commission’s report makes clear that 
expansion at Gatwick is deliverable.’9  
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Over the summer of 2015, local residents around Heathrow and anti-expansion groups 
strived to bring the issue of airport expansion back into the domain of politics, putting 
political pressure on to David Cameron by drawing public attention to his earlier pre-
election commitments to a ‘no ifs not buts’ pledge against expansion at the London 
airport. On 13 July 2015, 13 activists from Plane Stupid occupied the northern runway 
at Heathrow Airport for six hours, unfurling banners with ‘no third runway, no ifs, no 
buts’. On the day of the release of the final report, local residents had blocked the 
Heathrow Airport tunnel. Protests were also undertaken at the Conservative party 
conference in October 2015, with protesters demonstrating outside conference behind 
a model plane emblazoned with ‘no third runway, no ifs , no buts’, and also piping 
aircraft noises in the early morning to delegates staying in the Midland Hotel. In fact, 
in this context Cameron’s ‘no ifs, no buts’ slogan began to operate as a point of 
common opposition, which enabled campaigners to draw equivalences between 
demands for noise controls, carbon emissions reductions, stronger political leadership 
and increased corporate regulation, all of which were predicated on the threat of the 
third runway at Heathrow to local communities and their wellbeing.10 
 
Such protests went hand-in-hand with the politicisation of the issue of air quality as 
campaigners shifted the public terrain of argumentation on to the Commission’s 
analysis of air quality and the capacity of an expanded Heathrow airport to meet EU 
limits on air pollution. On 24 July, a group of some 6 local council leaders, 8 MPs, 
environmental pressure groups such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the 
Aviation Environment Federation, as well as HACAN and other local resident groups 
wrote an open letter to the Prime minister arguing that Heathrow expansion would not 
meet air quality limits and throwing doubt on the consultation on air quality by the 
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Airports Commission. The signatories of the letter stated that air quality was not taken 
‘seriously’ by the Commission. They bemoaned the ‘exceptional consultation’ on air 
quality undertaken by the Commission which begun on 08 May and ended only three 
weeks later on 29 May, one month before the publication of the report. Indeed, they 
threw doubt on the alleged ‘open’ approach of the Commission, suggesting that the 
‘Commission effectively treated the consultation as a tick box exercise and one that 
was immaterial to the overall report.’11 
 
Equally, the Commission’s backgrounding of aviation’s impact on climate change 
came under sustained attack. Plane Stupid decried the Davies Commission for having 
‘completed fudged the climate change implications’. Similarly, James Lees of the 
Aviation Environment Federation - a leading environmental think tank - condemned 
the Commission for failing to take full account of aviation’s carbon emissions. He 
suggested that ‘Sir Howard’s lack of interest in all things climate-related also appears 
to represent the Airports Commission’s approach to this issue’. Typically, such attacks 
challenged the allegedly rational and reasonable approach of the Commission, and 
indeed the previous appeals to the reputational power and personal style of Howard 
Davies. Greenpeace also belittled the environmental case for expansion in the final 
report, when it asserted that it was so ‘riddled with holes that you could fly an Airbus 
through [it]’. Greenpeace thus challenged the very foundations of the work of the 
Commission by arguing that the final report exhibited a ‘tendency to assume that all 
sorts of wonderful and unexpected things will happen and relies on this procession of 
political implausibilities to make the third runway plausible. It is really only one step 
away from saying “so long as someone solves all the problems, there’ll be no 
problems”’.12 
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Local residents, councils and environmental groups also moved to attack the character 
and reputation of Howard Davies by seeking to undermine his legitimacy and capacity 
to function as a sort of universal symbol of authority, who standing above the political 
battle could successfully mask over the differences between the competing demands 
upon the Airports Commission. In July, for example, reports surfaced that the Local 
Authorities Aircraft Noise Council was considering legal action against the ‘biased 
and flawed’ report of the Airports Commission. And in early August, Teddington 
Action Group threw doubt on the independence of Howard Davies, when they alleged 
that he worked as a board member of Prudential insurance company, which spent 
some £300 million on properties around Heathrow in the run-up to the publication of 
the final report. By the end of August, local councils in south London were publicly 
claiming that the Airports Commission ‘buried’ economic evidence that challenged its 
forecasts. Gatwick Airport added its voice to these interventions by publishing its own 
riposte to the findings of the Commission. In an accompanying press release, its Chief 
Executive argued that ‘the final report contains so many omissions and basic errors 
that its reliability as the basis of aviation policy must be called into question. The 
findings of this report simply do not add up’. Indeed, such public attacks led Sir 
Howard Davies to respond formally to the list of charges against the work of the 
Commission; he not only sought to counter the charges raised by Gatwick, but also 
opposed those advanced by the London Assembly.13  
 
The upshot of this protest was that by the end of the summer, the equivalences that 
had been constructed, and which had held together the broad coalition that had 
successfully opposed Labour’s proposals for a third runway at Heathrow, were 
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quickly being reassembled. In September 2015, there was the launch of the cross-party 
No Third Runway campaign, while the London Assembly voted against the third 
runway proposal, and all of the main candidates for the London mayoral elections 
came out against expansion at Heathrow. In addition, Labour’s new leader, Jeremy 
Corbyn, who had opposed the third runway during his leadership campaign, appointed 
John McDonnell – a long-time vocal opponent of Heathrow expansion and MP for 
Hayes and Harlington near the airport - as his shadow chancellor. His appointment, 
and the election of Corbyn, signalled a change in the approach of the Labour 
leadership towards the aviation industry. At an October rally against the third runway, 
for instance, McDonnell publicly condemned the industry, sketching out an alternative 
narrative in which aviation was once again depicted as a threat to the well-being of 
local residents and the environment. Indeed, McDonnell amplified attempts to 
politicise the issue of air quality, informing campaigners that ‘in my constituency […] 
people are literally dying. They’re dying because the air has already been poisoned by 
the aviation industry.’14  
 
Attacks of this sort gained institutional support from the House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee (EAC). A report published in 2015 attacked the 
analytical underpinnings of the Airports Commission, and pinpointed limitations 
within its data, and indeed its interpretation of the data. The EAC here called for the 
Committee on Climate Change to cast its judgement comment’ on the forecasts of the 
Airports Commission and its policy scenarios, and implored the government to ‘act on 
any recommendations’ from this additional scrutiny of the work of the Commission. 
Once again, its criticisms were particularly strident on the issue of air quality, where it 
called for the government to: position itself in relation to the Commission’s 
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interpretation of the Air Quality Directive; demonstrate how its air quality strategy 
could meet over time legal pollution limits; and to put in place effective monitoring 
and binding air quality measures for expansion, whilst making clear how it would 
disaggregate air pollution from transport and from aviation. Significantly, the EAC 
had been one of the institutional actors that had dismantled the expert and knowledge 
claims of the 2003 Air Transport White Paper and its discourse of ‘sustainable 
aviation’ under New Labour.15  
 
Just a week after the publication of its autumn report into the recommendations of the 
Airports Commission, and as if taking his script from the EAC, Patrick McLoughin, 
Secretary of State for Transport, announced to Parliament that the government would 
undertake further studies before coming to a conclusion on the recommendations of 
the final report of the Airports Commission. McLoughlin repeated that the Cameron 
government ‘accepts the case for expansion’, arguing that Commission made a ‘strong 
case for expansion in the south-east’. But, any government decision on expansion was 
put back until summer 2016. The rationale for this delay was that, after more than 3 
years of investigation by the Commission, there was nonetheless a need for further 
information and clarification. In fact, the government openly acknowledged the 
EAC’s reservations over the impact of airport expansion on air quality, noise 
mitigation and carbon emissions. Indeed, McLoughlin himself informed Parliament 
that ‘I want to get this decision right. That means getting the environmental response 
right.’ Importantly, the government did not come out in favour of any specific option 
for expansion, with McLoughlin informing Parliament that ‘we are continuing to 
consider all 3 schemes’.16 
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Overall, therefore, some six months after the publication of the Airports 
Commission’s final report in July 2015, the Conservative government announced what 
was to become another ten months delay before it came out in support of expansion at 
Heathrow Airport in October 2016. In a relatively short space of time, and crucially 
for our analysis, there had been a re-politicisation of aviation policy, which had 
scuppered the presumption that an ‘evidence-based consensus’ had emerged from the 
work of the Airports Commission. In fact, Howard Davies had to publicly defend the 
Commission’s methods of working, while the ‘science of airport expansion’ – the 
methods and data analysis underpinning the work of the Commission – was once 
again being contested by many of the same actors who delegitimised the 2003 Air 
Transport White Paper. More fully, the Commission’s calculations of the impact of 
rising carbon emissions had been brought into question, as had its calculation of the 
numbers affected by noise pollution.  
 
Most notably, the alleged misinterpretation of existing air quality regulations in the 
final report of the Commission, as well as widespread contestation of its analysis into 
the ability of an expanded Heathrow to meet EU air quality demands, led the 
government to announce further environmental studies. In short, a strong case can be 
made that the work of the Airports Commission, especially its efforts to depoliticise 
aviation policy, had failed by the summer of 2015, although this is not to dismiss the 
work of the Commission in underpinning the policy shift of the Conservative 
government towards expansion. But all such ideological cover evaporated with 
McLoughlin’s acknowledgement of the ‘need’ for further evidence and studies, as the 
ball was firmly put back in the court of government; put alternatively, responsibility 
for decision-making was publicly returned to government and the domain of politics. 
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Ironically, after a commission that was supposed to marshal all available evidence for 
government, the Cameron government delayed any decision under the pretext of 
seeking further information. 
 
 
SO CLOSE, YET SO FAR 
 
As Claus Offe has pointed out, the ‘real effects’ of any expert committee ‘emerge only 
in the course of conflict-ridden attempts to apply them.’ Expert committees thus offer 
little more than the respite of a ‘phoney war’, allowing multiple stakeholders to 
‘prepare themselves for [the] possible trench-warfare’ that follows.17 Indeed, if we 
turn to an assessment of the success of the Davies Commission since the publication 
of its final report a radically different picture emerges. Seen from this perspective, it is 
hard to refute claims that Davies has failed as a process, in terms of politics, and even 
in terms of its programmatic outcomes.  
 
Equally, in a short space of time, the political context shifted. The carbon coalition 
that was successfully forged to oppose the expansion at Heathrow during the last years 
of New Labour has been reactivated. At the same time, support from the aviation 
industry has waxed and waned, as Gatwick airport has continued to lobby for 
expansion, while actively contesting the case for Heathrow. Within the Labour party, 
the election of Corbyn, and his appointment of McDonnell as Shadow Chancellor, 
have constrained any opportunities to develop a party leadership consensus on the 
expansion of Heathrow. In fact, the cabinet remains divided with leading ministers 
and Conservative party dignitaries opposing expansion at Gatwick and Heathrow.  
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The publication of the final report also triggered rival discursive strategies by 
opponents of expansion at Heathrow airport, who sought to re-politicise the issue and 
propose alternatives. Such rhetorical operations included efforts to add the issue of air 
quality and air pollution to the existing terrain of public argumentation; a concerted 
challenge to the reliability and impartiality of experts and their predictions, as well as 
the personal reputation of Howard Davies; and the forging of new alliances between 
groups and campaigns. The latter was accomplished through a persistent repetition of 
the broken ‘no ifs, no buts’ promise and by exposing and criticising the dominant 
‘fantasy narrative’ of aviation, which implies that the continued expansion of airport 
capacity leading to greater economic growth could be seamlessly squared with 
environmental protections and sustainability.  
 
This ‘reality’ of the trench warfare to come was in many ways the ‘elephant in the 
room’ throughout the work of the Airports Commission. The conflicting reactions to 
the publication of its interim report at the end of 2013 merely exposed the 
politicisation that was to follow the publication of its final report in 2015. Indeed, 
when Howard Davies gave evidence to the Transport Select Committee in January 
2014, he was asked to comment on his mission to ‘secure an evidence-based 
consensus’, and the dismissal of the interim report by the then Mayor of London, 
Boris Johnson, who described the report as ‘gloppy and tangled, perplexing and odd, 
and its recommendations to some extent severed from the evidence.’ Howard Davies 
promptly replied: ‘Well, he would say that wouldn’t he!’18 Here, we conclude, are the 
limits of the Airports Commission as a strategy of depoliticisation. Its creation staved 
off the trench warfare in order to give the Conservative government the ideological 
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cover to reverse its own policy commitments. But in no way did its methods of 
working and its appeals to evidence transform the preferences of those opposed to 
expansion. And neither could its exclusionary practices be masked over once the final 
recommendations were made public. If anything, the conflicts between different 
airports, between airports and their surrounding communities, between politicians 
(within and across parties, and among tiers of government), and between many 




THE DECISION TO EXPAND AS A POLITICAL FAILURE 
  
Against this background, the May government’s support for Heathrow expansion is 
fraught with difficulties. There is no guarantee of success. How, therefore, should we 
interpret the legacy of the Airports Commission? And how do we attribute blame for 
this failure once again to tackle the ‘wicked issue’ of aviation expansion? As these 
questions suggest, we situate the work of the Airports Commission within a tangled 
web of political failures and policy reversals. In the first place, the belated decision to 
expand Heathrow can be seen as a failure of political and ideological leadership. 
Before David Cameron became Prime Minister, he made a “no ifs, no buts” promise 
that there would be no new runway, and the coalition declared a moratorium on 
expansion in May 2010. But in 2012, after an intense campaign led by business, 
supporters of Heathrow and London First, the coalition agreed to set up the Airports 
Commission and thus reopened the case. What is more, the commission’s brief was to 
examine where the new capacity should be — Gatwick, Heathrow or even “Boris 
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Island” — rather than whether there should be expansion in the southeast at all. 
Finally, the aviation industry’s demand for more hub capacity (in which an airport is a 
stepping stone to another destination) made it difficult to argue for spreading 
expansion across London airports or to regional ones, thus balancing the costs and 
benefits of expansion. 
  
Secondly, and seen in a longer historical perspective, there has been a failure to 
recognise that the wrong decision was made in the 1940s to build Heathrow in the first 
place. Because the airport is in the wrong geographical location, causing noise 
pollution for the large number of residents who languish under its flight paths, further 
expansion can only exacerbate its detrimental effects. Indeed, the 2014 Survey of 
Noise Attitudes, published by the Civil Aviation Authority in February 2017, adds to 
the concerns over noise pollution. The report demonstrates the increasing annoyance 
caused by aircraft noise at lower levels than previously recognized, as well as 
underlining the links between noise annoyance and poor health.  
 
Seen in these terms, the decision to expand Heathrow might be seen as a failure 
stemming from path dependency and institutional inertia, which goes to the heart of 
the British state and system of government. This brings to mind the Roskill 
Commission inquiry of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which was set up to find a 
location for a third London airport. Roskill’s findings were ignored by the government 
in favour of a different site at Maplin, only for it to abandon that plan when the 1973 
oil crisis hit the aviation industry and local MPs threatened to rebel. The upshot has 
been the dissemination of the “have-your-cake-and-eat-it” narrative that says we can 
have both airport expansion and environmental protection. In this fantasy, the threat of 
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not acting and thus falling behind our foreign competitors is bolstered by the beatific 
prospect of adding billions to the economy when the new runway is actually built. 
 
A third and critical failure of the new scheme relates to the critical issue of air 
pollution, which is the cause of major respiratory problems and premature deaths. The 
problem of meeting legally binding air quality targets in London and surrounding 
areas was not properly addressed by the Davies Commission, and for that matter by 
successive governments. Government plans to meet its 2030 air quality targets are 
highly contested, as the recent court case by legal campaigners, ClientEarth, goes to 
show. The idea that a reduction of car emissions in and around the airport, for 
example, will enable expansion plans to meet the required air pollution targets looks 
wildly optimistic. 
 
Fourthly, and crucially, the plans constitute a failure to tackle climate change. The 
anti-expansion coalition that successfully challenged New Labour’s 2003 Air 
Transport White Paper put the problem of aircraft emissions and our international 
commitments to curb climate change at the centre of its campaign. Indeed, in setting 
out a consultation about airport capacity in 2011, the then Secretary of State for 
Transport, Philip Hammond, dismissed the previous thinking as “out of date because it 
fails to give sufficient weight to the challenge of climate change.” Yet, once again, 
environmental considerations have been shoved aside both by the Commission and in 
the wider public debate that has ensued, particularly within the shifting context of 
Brexit and the pursuit of new trading links for the UK economy. Signalling such 
shifting priorities in the foreword to the initial consultation document on the draft 
Airports National Policy Statement, Chris Grayling, Secretary of State for Transport, 
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boldly repeated well-versed claims that ‘aviation is a British success story’. He thus 
framed support for Heathrow expansion in terms of the way in which air travel 
‘supports economic growth, provides the connections we need to travel and trade, and 
is at the core of Britain’s standing in the global marketplace.’  
 
The initial consultation on the national policy statement closed in May 2017, having 
amassed some 70, 000 responses. However, it ended with the government’s own 
timetable for a decision over the third runway thrown up in the air by the snap Brexit 
general election in June 2017. The surprising outcome of the general election, at least 
for most observers, weakened May’s support in the Commons, arguably 
reinvigorating the Corbyn leadership and its opposition to expansion, while doing 
little to offset Cabinet divisions on Heathrow. At the same time, it effectively pushed 
any decision on the third runway at Heathrow back to the spring or summer of 2018.  
In any case, further delay to any government decision was acknowledged by Grayling, 
when he announced in September 2017 the need for a new consultation and select 
committee scrutiny of revised forecasts, noise analysis and air quality plans in 
response to earlier challenges to government, not least by Client Earth.  
 
This new consultation, which began in October 2017, immediately opened up new 
opportunities to contest the final report of the Commission. Notably, Zac Goldsmith 
greeted the publication of the revised draft National Airports Policy Statement with 
further attacks on the work of the Commission. He pointed out that in the more than 
two years since the publication of its final report, the context in which the 
Commission made its recommendations had changed to such an extent that the 
assumptions underpinning this ‘bedrock of the government’s decision’ had been 
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‘undermined’ by changes to ‘data on passenger numbers, on economic benefits and 
most of all on pollution.’ Indeed, Stewart Wingate, the chief executive of Gatwick 
airport, echoed such concerns, declaring that ‘the new information, based on updated 
forecasts, effectively turns the Airports Commission’s work on its head. They 
completely undermine the basis of the case for expanding Heathrow.’ Importantly, in 
early December 2017, ClientEarth won the right to a new hearing in the High Court 
for its challenge to the May government’s revised air quality plans, with the hearing 
scheduled to open in February 2018. 
 
In many ways, the May government is confronted with an even more constraining 
‘rock and a hard place’ dilemma than the one which the Davies Commission was 
designed to resolve, following its establishment in September 2012. It thus continues 
to face pressures from elements of the business community and the City of London, 
who wish to expand Heathrow, while carriers such as British Airways and Virgin 
Atlantic criticize the cost of expansion and the potential rise in landing fees for 
carriers (Times 09 October 2017). And, as a result partly of its own linkages between 
Heathrow and Brexit, it cannot insulate debates over expansion from the political 
uncertainties generated by Brexit negotiations. Indeed, Lord Adonis, former chair of 
the National Infrastructure Commission, publicly warned that a ‘hard Brexit’ could 
scupper any plans for Heathrow expansion (Guardian, 26 June 2017). But, at the same 
time, local residents, environmental lobbies and direct-action protesters have 
continued to contest expansion, challenging proposals for new runways at either 
Heathrow or Gatwick. Significantly, the government’s Clean Growth Strategy, which 
it published in October 2017, appeared to try and respond to these contradictory 
demands. It suggested that government could still meet the Climate Change Act 
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requirement of an 80 per cent reductions in 1990 levels of carbon emissions by 2050 if 
carbon emissions from aviation rose to 44MtCO2e, above the 37.5 MtCO2e advocated 
by the Committee on Climate Change.  
 
 A final and equally telling problem therefore is that in all likelihood the plans will 
end in another disappointing failure to deliver a mega-infrastructure project on time 
and within costs. Legal challenges by councils and other affected parties, the precise 
financing of the proposals (who, for example, will pay for the surface infrastructures 
needed), coupled with political challenges, will invariably delay the implementation of 
plans - if they happen at all. At the end of November 2017, the draft New London Plan 
committed the Mayor of London to oppose expansion at Heathrow ‘unless it can be 
shown that no additional noise or air quality harm would result, and that the benefits 
of future regulatory and technology improvements would be fairly shared with 
affected communities.’ Indeed, local councils are already preparing to review the 
decisions and planning procedures in the courts, while local resident groups and direct 
action campaigners, such as Plane Stupid, are sharpening their preferred tools of 
protest. We can expect the third runway to become a symbolic battle for 
environmental campaigners. Heathrow could well end up being the next Notre-Dame-
des-Landes, the proposed international airport outside Nantes. Plans for this 
development were resurrected in the early 2000s, having been first mooted in the 
1960s and 1970s.  However, the French government finally abandoned the project in 




  24 
CONCLUSION 
 
Where does this leave us now? In our view, any decision to bring the issue of 
additional capacity at British airports back onto the political agenda should first have 
been backed up by the elaboration of a new sustainable vision for maintaining the 
UK’s position in global aviation. Of course, individual airports like Heathrow have 
sought to develop sustainable visions for the future. For example, the airport published 
its Heathrow 2.0 plans in February 2017. However, such industry-led visions 
reproduce the increasingly discredited ideology of ‘sustainable aviation’, which 
appeals to technological innovation, better information and dialogue, and the 
mechanisms of carbon offsetting to legitimise aviation growth while allegedly 
delivering at the same time environmental protection. As such, they continue to be 
framed by long-embedded commitments to increase airport capacity, rather than 
addressing head-on the challenges of climate change, noise pollution and risks to air 
quality.  
 
An alternative strategy would thus have to step outside this dominant policy frame of 
threats to airport capacity and then realign airport policy towards demand management 
and the politics of sufficiency. This would probably involve a strategy that prioritized 
continuing global aviation links with key trading partners, such as China and the 
United States, while elaborating creative fiscal solutions to better manage demand for 
short-haul flights, while also generating new communication technologies and 
developing alternative transport infrastructures within the UK and Europe. Such an 
alternative strategywould have delivered on the 2010 commitments to put 
sustainability before aviation expansion, although it would no doubt have required the 
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political acumen to integrate it into a more universal strategy by government and other 
powerful social forces, and then gain the endorsement of sufficiently large swathes of 
citizens and the electorate.  
 
Of course, it is true that the removal of Justine Greening from the Department for 
Transport hampered the development of an alternative image of sustainable aviation. 
But in the absence of an alternative political vision, the back door was left open for 
pro-expansionists subtly to reframe the aviation debate around the need to maintain 
UK’s global hub. Here they were helped by the inclusion of aviation in the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme, which effectively enabled them to side-line 
environmental concerns over the rising carbon emissions from air travel. When 
pushed to defend itself against this different angle of attack, the anti-expansion forces 
were unable to develop a new understanding of aviation in an increasingly competitive 
and globalized world, though such difficulties applied equally to government, as well 
as local protesters and environmental campaigners. Starved of the equivalent of an 
‘integrated transport system’ with which to confront pro-expansion forces, and 
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